skills/0juano/agent-skills/ticktick/Gen Agent Trust Hub

ticktick

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The resolve_project function in scripts/tt.sh is vulnerable to Python code injection. It interpolates the shell variable $input directly into a Python string literal within a python3 -c command: name = '$input'.lower(). If the input contains a single quote, an attacker can break out of the string and execute arbitrary Python code. This affects several skill commands including tasks, add, complete, and update whenever a project name or ID is provided.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (HIGH): The command injection vulnerability can be leveraged to exfiltrate the TICKTICK_TOKEN or local system files by executing network commands like curl from within the injected Python context.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The vulnerability allows for arbitrary code execution on the runner because user-controlled strings (project names, IDs) are insecurely handled during script execution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Data fetched from the TickTick API via scripts/tt.sh (e.g., task titles and notes). Boundary markers: Absent; task data is displayed to the agent in a simple markdown list format. Capability inventory: Network access (curl), command execution (bash, python3), and access to secrets via environment variables. Sanitization: None; external data is not escaped or validated before being presented to the agent's context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 20, 2026, 07:48 PM