skills/0xbigboss/claude-code/codex/Gen Agent Trust Hub

codex

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill is designed to run the codex CLI tool in --full-auto mode by default. This grants the subagent workspace-write capabilities and automatic approval for changes, allowing for broad, autonomous modification of the local filesystem and repository state.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): The task description from $ARGUMENTS is interpolated directly into the CODEX_PROMPT heredoc. If the agent is instructed to use this skill on untrusted input (e.g., 'fix the bug described in this issue: [malicious content]'), an attacker could inject instructions to override the subagent's constraints or perform unauthorized actions.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (LOW): The skill provides the subagent with tools to read the entire codebase (Glob, Grep, Read, cat). While necessary for its primary purpose, these tools could be abused to locate and extract sensitive information like environment variables or local configuration files if a malicious task is executed.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW):
  • Ingestion points: The $ARGUMENTS variable is used to populate the <task> section of the prompt (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The prompt uses structured XML-like tags (<context>, <task>, <constraints>, <output>) to separate instructions from data, which provides some protection but can be bypassed by sophisticated injections.
  • Capability inventory: Full file system write access (via codex), git repository management, and the ability to execute background tasks.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the user-provided arguments is performed before interpolation into the subagent prompt.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 05:48 PM