codex

[Skill Scanner] Backtick command substitution detected All findings: [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] [HIGH] command_injection: Backtick command substitution detected (CI003) [AITech 9.1.4] This skill's declared purpose matches its capabilities: it must read git state and run commands to perform autonomous repo work. However, it sets unsafe defaults and grants very broad tool permissions (default --full-auto with workspace-write and wildcard-like allowed-tools). There are no explicit network endpoints or obfuscated payloads in the fragment, so there is no direct evidence of malware in this file itself. Still, the configuration is high-risk in practice because it enables autonomous, write-capable operations without explicit confirmations and relies on an external codex CLI binary (a trust boundary). Recommendation: treat as SUSPICIOUS — require explicit user confirmation (avoid default full-auto), restrict allowed-tools to the minimum needed, sandbox by default (read-only or explicit workspace-write), and ensure the codex CLI binary is from a trusted source before use. LLM verification: No explicit malware is present in the skill text itself, but the design and defaults create significant supply-chain and privilege risks. The skill gives an external CLI broad authority (default auto-approved workspace-write) without documenting provenance or network behavior, which makes it suitable for credential theft or repository exfiltration if the codex binary or backend is malicious or compromised. Recommend treating this skill as SUSPICIOUS: require explicit user approval for workspace-