Code Review Recon

Purpose

Prevent blind spots by mapping how untrusted data enters and moves through the codebase.

Inputs

• code_path
• language_framework
• deployment_notes (optional)

Workflow

Phase 1: Topology Mapping

1. Identify entry layers: HTTP routes, RPC, CLI, cron/jobs, message consumers.
2. Identify boundary layers: auth middleware, policy checks, service interfaces.
3. Identify sink layers: database, templates, OS commands, file system, network calls.

Phase 2: Route and Handler Inventory

1. Enumerate handlers and parameter parsers.
2. Map per-route auth and role assumptions.
3. Flag routes with weak or missing guards.

Phase 3: Sink Inventory

1. Query construction paths.
2. File operations and archive extraction.
3. Serialization/deserialization and parser usage.
4. Outbound request constructors.

Phase 4: Trust Boundary Audit

1. Track user-to-service boundary crossings.
2. Track tenant and organization boundary assumptions.
3. Track privileged action boundaries.

Phase 5: Handoff Plan

1. Rank high-risk source-to-sink paths.
2. Provide per-path context needed for deep analysis.
3. Note uncertain areas requiring runtime confirmation.

Recon Coverage Targets

Target	Minimum Expectation
Entry points	all major ingestion vectors mapped
Auth boundaries	per-route enforcement identified
Sink categories	full inventory with owner file/function
Prioritized paths	top attacker-value paths ranked

Output Contract

{
  "entry_points": [],
  "auth_boundary_map": [],
  "sink_inventory": [],
  "priority_trace_paths": [],
  "unknowns": []
}

Constraints

• Favor breadth, traceability, and reproducibility.
• Do not claim vulnerabilities in recon phase.

Quality Checklist

• Non-HTTP sources are included.
• Auth assumptions are explicit.
• Handoff paths are actionable.

Detailed Operator Notes

Cross-Layer Trace Requirements

• Include controller, service, data access, and sink layers.
• Include serialization/deserialization boundary handling.
• Include async boundaries (queue/job/event) where data crosses trust zones.

Access-Control Audit Rules

• Verify policy check location relative to resource fetch.
• Verify policy check occurs on every variant path.
• Verify tenant scoping is enforced at data query layer.

Sanitization Audit Rules

• Context-match sanitizer to sink type.
• Confirm canonicalization happens before validation.
• Check for alternate branch paths that skip sanitizer.

Reporting Rules

• Include function-level path with file and symbol names.
• Include bypass narrative for missing or weak control.
• Include a precise fix location and test recommendation.

Quick Scenarios

Scenario A: Access Check Placement

• Trace data fetch point.
• Trace policy check point.
• Determine whether check occurs before use.
• Identify alternate path without check.

Scenario B: Sanitization Mismatch

• Map sink execution context.
• Map sanitizer type and location.
• Validate context compatibility.
• Find branch that bypasses sanitizer.

Scenario C: Adjacent Pattern Sweep

• Identify sibling handlers/sinks.
• Compare guard and validation parity.
• Flag inconsistent control patterns.
• Prioritize high-impact siblings.

Conditional Decision Matrix

Condition	Action	Evidence Requirement
Source passes through helper wrappers	inline helper logic into trace	wrapper-expanded path
Policy check exists after data fetch	test prefetch exposure and side-effects	order-of-operations trace
Sanitizer exists but context mismatch	craft context-correct exploit hypothesis	sink-context mismatch proof
Async boundary carries tainted data	trace serialization and consumer validation	producer-consumer trace
Sibling route has weaker guards	run parity scan across sibling handlers	guard parity matrix

Advanced Coverage Extensions

1. Compare DTO/schema validation between create and update paths.
2. Scan migration scripts and admin tasks for latent unsafe operations.
3. Validate cache-layer authorization consistency.
4. Validate feature-flagged code paths for missing controls.
5. Validate error handling paths for secret leakage.