book-cover-design
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 19, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- Remote Code Execution (CRITICAL): The skill instructs the user/agent to execute
curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh. This is a high-risk piped remote execution pattern. The source domaininference.shis not a trusted external source (e.g., GitHub/Vercel/OpenAI), meaning the contents of the script are unverified and can be changed by the owner at any time to execute malicious code. - Dynamic Execution (MEDIUM): The skill uses
npx skills addto fetch and execute remote skills frominference-sh/skills. This introduces external dependencies from an untrusted source that could perform unverified operations at runtime. - Indirect Prompt Injection (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted data.
- Ingestion points: User input is interpolated directly into
infsh app runprompts (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the prompt strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute shell commands (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: Absent; the prompts are passed to the CLI tool without escaping or validation, potentially allowing for shell argument injection if the agent is coerced.
- Data Exposure & Exfiltration (LOW): The skill initiates network operations via
curland theinfshCLI to a non-whitelisted domain (inference.sh). While consistent with the stated purpose of image generation, it establishes a communication channel with an untrustworthy external endpoint.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata