customer-persona

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the user to run curl -fsSL https://cli.inference.sh | sh to install its primary tool. This pattern is dangerous because it downloads and immediately executes code from a remote server without prior inspection.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is granted permission to use the Bash tool with the command pattern infsh *. This allows the agent to execute any sub-command provided by the downloaded infsh binary.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation indicates that the installation script further downloads binary files from dist.inference.sh, which is a domain controlled by the author but not recognized as a trusted or well-known service provider.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its data ingestion pipeline.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via tavily/search-assistant and exa/search tools (referenced in SKILL.md) when researching market trends.
  • Boundary markers: There are no visible delimiters or system instructions to ignore potential malicious commands embedded within the retrieved search results.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to run infsh, which can interact with various external APIs and potentially perform sensitive operations.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the external content before it is processed by the LLM to generate customer personas.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://cli.inference.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Mar 8, 2026, 02:51 AM