url-analysis
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill processes untrusted external content and possesses capabilities that can be triggered by that content.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/validate-urls.pyreads file content usingPath.read_text()to find URLs. - Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to disregard instructions within analyzed files.
- Capability inventory: The
requests.head()function performs network operations;Path.read_text()performs file reads. - Sanitization: Absent. The script does not validate target domains or block private IP ranges (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254), enabling SSRF attacks.
- Data Exfiltration (HIGH): The validation script allows for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). By providing a file containing URLs for internal services or cloud metadata endpoints, an attacker can use the agent's environment to scan local networks or exfiltrate sensitive environment info via headers or redirects.
- Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill relies on a Python script that accepts local file paths. If an agent is manipulated into passing sensitive system paths (e.g.,
~/.aws/credentials), the script will read the file and attempt to process it for URLs, potentially exposing information in logs or results. - External Downloads (LOW): The script depends on the
requestslibrary. While a common and reputable package, it is not part of the standard library and is not pinned to a specific version, representing a minor supply chain best-practice violation. - Metadata Poisoning (LOW): The
SKILL.mddocumentation incorrectly referencesscripts/validate_urls.py, whereas the provided file is namedscripts/validate-urls.py. This discrepancy can lead to execution errors or confusion.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata