content-factory
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto execute various system commands, includingcurlfor making network requests,passfor retrieving API keys from the user's password manager, andpkillto manage browser processes.- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill aggregates data from over 10 external platforms, including unofficial third-party APIs such as60s.viki.moeandpullpush.ioto collect trending content from Weibo, Zhihu, and Reddit.- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive session information, specifically cookies and storage state files located in~/.playwright-data/and~/.xiaohongshu/, to automate publishing tasks on social media.- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection due to its automated processing of untrusted external content. - Ingestion points: Trending topics and summaries are fetched from multiple public social platforms in
scripts/aggregator/fetch_all.py. - Boundary markers: The prompts in
scripts/topic_scorer.pyandscripts/content_generator.pydo not utilize delimiters or specific instructions to ignore malicious commands embedded in the fetched data. - Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for network posting via
scripts/auto_publisher.pyand local command execution viascripts/draft_reviewer.py. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the incoming titles or summaries before they are interpolated into LLM prompts.
Audit Metadata