feishu-channel
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection vulnerability surface. The skill provides a message bridge that accepts input from external Feishu users and processes it through the agent without sufficient sanitization or instruction boundaries.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Ingestion point: The
scripts/feishu-webhook.jsfile implements a Webhook listener at the/webhook/feishuendpoint that accepts POST requests containing user-generated message content from the Feishu platform. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Boundary markers: The message payload is forwarded to the OpenClaw Gateway as a JSON object, but it is not wrapped in specific delimiters or accompanied by instructions to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded in the user text.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Capability inventory: The skill is configured in
SKILL.mdto have access to several high-privilege tools, includingBashand file system operations (Read,Write,Edit), making it a potential target for exploitation via indirect injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Sanitization: Although the script parses the message from JSON and removes
@mentiontokens, it performs no filtering or validation to detect or block prompt injection patterns within the message text.
Audit Metadata