openclaw-inter-instance

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation explicitly instructs on the use of the nodes.run tool to execute arbitrary shell commands on remote instances using bash -c. Evidence includes templates for checking files, cloning repositories, and managing symlinks.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By design, the skill provides a mechanism for cross-machine remote code execution. It suggests using env -u to bypass proxy settings during git clone operations from external sources and provides methods to inject messages directly into remote agent sessions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'GLM-5 Identity Overwrite' section contains instructions to use CRITICAL IDENTITY forced declarations to override the AI's internal persona or safety constraints ('Kiro'人设). This represents a direct attempt to manipulate and bypass default agent behavior.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's primary functions involve moving data across network boundaries, including syncing repositories and accessing remote 'memory' directories, which could be leveraged to exfiltrate sensitive information from a compromised instance.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'File-level communication' strategy involves writing instructions directly into the workspace memory files (memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md) of other instances.
  • Ingestion points: Remote instance memory files (memory/*.md) and session message streams.
  • Boundary markers: None specified in the instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Remote shell execution (nodes.run), session messaging (sessions_send), and file writing.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the messages being passed between instances is described.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 9, 2026, 10:14 PM