twitter-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection by retrieving and processing content from external Twitter sources.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via tools like
TWITTER_RECENT_SEARCH,TWITTER_BOOKMARKS_BY_USER, andTWITTER_POST_LOOKUP_BY_POST_IDas documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no instructions or delimiters provided to differentiate external tweet content from system instructions or to warn the agent about embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill enables significant write operations, including
TWITTER_CREATION_OF_A_POST,TWITTER_POST_DELETE_BY_POST_ID, andTWITTER_UNLIKE_POST. - Sanitization: No sanitization or content validation is mentioned for the retrieved data before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the configuration of a remote third-party service.
- Evidence: The documentation instructs users to add
https://rube.app/mcpas an MCP server. This endpoint is responsible for providing tool schemas and managing Twitter OAuth connections.
Audit Metadata