wechat-channel

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The Express API endpoints /api/contacts and /api/rooms in scripts/wechat-bridge.js do not implement authentication checks. This allows any network-connected entity to retrieve the user's WeChat contact list and group identifiers.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The /api/send endpoint in scripts/wechat-bridge.js allows sending local files from the host system to WeChat via the path parameter. This capability could be abused to exfiltrate sensitive files if the API secret is leaked or bypassed.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The bridge facilitates indirect prompt injection by forwarding raw message text from WeChat users to the AI Agent. Because the agent has high-privilege tools like Bash and Write, an attacker could potentially hijack the agent's logic via a WeChat message.\n
  • Ingestion points: scripts/wechat-bridge.js message event listener (line 104).\n
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the raw text is forwarded within a JSON payload to the agent without instruction-delimiters.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash, Read, Write, and Edit tools.\n
  • Sanitization: Absent; the code only trims @mentions and does not filter for malicious instruction patterns.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The /api/send endpoint supports fetching content from arbitrary URLs via FileBox.fromUrl. This can be utilized as a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vector to scan or access internal network resources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 5, 2026, 07:57 AM