xiaohongshu-workflow

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Mar 5, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

  • Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt instructs obtaining cookie files and explicitly passing tokens (e.g., <xsec_token>) as command-line arguments and in scripts/commands, which requires embedding secret values verbatim and thus presents an exfiltration risk.

CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.

  • Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.85). These links point to third‑party GitHub repositories and direct release binaries (zip/tar.gz containing executables) and raw user scripts from individual/unverified accounts and the workflow explicitly instructs running them and handling cookies — a common vector for credential theft or malware, so they should be treated as suspicious until verified.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly fetches and ingests public, user-generated Xiaohongshu content via the MCP API (see SKILL.md and references/api-reference.md using tools like search_feeds and get_feed_detail) and the scripts (notably scripts/track-topic.py and mcp-call.sh) parse posts and comments and use that data to generate reports and drive replies/monitoring—so untrusted third‑party content is read and can materially influence actions.

MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Mar 5, 2026, 07:56 AM