youtube-downloader

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script scripts/download_video.py automatically installs the yt-dlp package using pip at runtime if it is not detected. This bypasses standard environment management and introduces a dependency on external package registries during execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the subprocess module to execute yt-dlp commands. While it uses argument lists to mitigate shell injection, it passes unvalidated external URLs and user-defined output paths directly to the system command.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The -o or --output parameter allows an operator or a malicious prompt to specify arbitrary filesystem paths. If the agent has sufficient permissions, this could be used to write files to sensitive directories outside of the intended /mnt/user-data/outputs/ path.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It fetches untrusted metadata (such as video titles) from YouTube via yt-dlp --dump-json and subsequently prints this data to the terminal and uses it to construct filenames.
  • Ingestion points: Video metadata is fetched from external YouTube URLs in scripts/download_video.py via get_video_info.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are used to separate the external metadata from the agent's logic.
  • Capability inventory: The script has the capability to write files to the disk and execute system commands via subprocess.run.
  • Sanitization: The script relies on yt-dlp's internal filename sanitization but does not sanitize the metadata before printing it to the standard output, which could influence the agent's next steps.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 5, 2026, 07:56 AM