browser-use

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requests high-privilege 'Bash' and 'Exec' tools in its metadata, allowing it to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The example configuration for the browser profile includes 'disable_security=True'. This flag disables critical browser-level protections like the Same-Origin Policy (SOP), which can be exploited by malicious websites to access local files or execute cross-site attacks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted content from external websites to drive AI decision-making.
  • Ingestion points: Reads and interprets HTML and webpage content via the 'Agent' class (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The provided examples do not use delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following malicious commands hidden in the web pages it visits.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is granted 'Bash', 'Exec', 'Read', and 'Write' tools, which could be abused if the AI is manipulated by external content.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of web content before it is processed by the LLM.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill handles sensitive information such as authentication state files ('polymarket_auth.json'), API keys, and cryptocurrency wallet addresses. The combination of browser access and file 'Write' permissions poses a risk of this data being leaked.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill suggests using non-standard third-party API providers ('cn.xingsuancode.com' and 'ai.9w7.cn') for LLM services, which are not verified vendors and could potentially intercept API keys or traffic.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 13, 2026, 06:58 AM