coding-agent

Fail

Audited by Snyk on Mar 13, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICAL
Full Analysis

CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

  • Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). This skill contains multiple deliberate-enabling patterns for unsandboxed remote code execution and data exfiltration (hardcoded API key, explicit "--yolo" / "elevated" modes that bypass sandboxing/approvals, background PTY sessions with stdin control, auto-commit/push and notification hooks to external services, and instructions to install third‑party agents), which together present a high risk of intentional abuse for credential theft, remote code execution, and exfiltration.

MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

  • Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The SKILL.md explicitly instructs cloning and operating on public GitHub repositories (e.g., "git clone https://github.com/user/repo.git $REVIEW_DIR" under "Reviewing PRs") and running coding agents in those workdirs, which means the agent fetches and interprets untrusted, user-generated third‑party code/content and can take actions (reviews, commits, pushes) influenced by that content.

MEDIUM W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

  • Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 0.70). The prompt does not explicitly ask for sudo, user creation, or editing system configs, but it repeatedly encourages running unsandboxed/elevated agents (e.g. --yolo, elevated:true, host execution) and running arbitrary install/command sequences that can modify the host state, so it meaningfully pushes the agent toward compromising the machine.

Issues (3)

E006
CRITICAL

Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

W011
MEDIUM

Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

W013
MEDIUM

Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Mar 13, 2026, 06:57 AM
Issues
3