create-viral-content
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Potential for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests user drafts and social media content through instructions in SKILL.md and various platform templates in resources/platform-templates.md.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers (such as XML tags or unique string wrappers) are used to separate untrusted input content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to generate new text based on input, perform multi-step refinement loops, and invoke secondary skills such as humanize-writing (noted in resources/humanize-integration.md).
- Sanitization: No input data sanitization or validation logic is present to filter out potential malicious instructions embedded within the content being refined.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Metadata inconsistency (Category 7). The author is listed as ice-ninja in the skill files, but the system context identifies the author as aAAaqwq. This discrepancy in metadata can complicate identity verification and trust assessment.
Audit Metadata