search-layer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic module loading in scripts/search.py to import sibling scripts using computed file paths at runtime.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill reads sensitive information from local files such as ~/.git-credentials and ~/.openclaw/credentials/search.json to obtain authentication tokens for GitHub and various search APIs.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves data from numerous external services, including the Tavily, Exa, and Grok APIs, as well as platforms like GitHub, Reddit, and Hacker News. These are well-known services and the downloads are essential for the skill's functionality.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from the web and includes it in prompts sent to an LLM for relevance evaluation.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/fetch_thread.py and scripts/search.py fetch data from arbitrary external URLs.
  • Boundary markers: Instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in some components but absent in the relevance_gate.py logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has full network access via Python's requests and urllib modules.
  • Sanitization: The skill performs basic HTML tag removal but does not sanitize content against adversarial prompt instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 13, 2026, 07:00 AM