ai-video-gen
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill processes untrusted external content (user prompts and voiceover text) and uses it to drive high-capability AI models and local file operations.
- Ingestion points: Command-line arguments
--promptand--textingenerate_video.pyandadd_voiceover.pyrespectively. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not use delimiters or instructions to prevent the model from obeying embedded instructions within the prompts.
- Capability inventory: Executes local subprocesses (
ffmpeg), writes files to the local disk (output/directory), and performs network operations to multiple external APIs (OpenAI, LumaAI, Replicate). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no filtering or validation of the input text before it is sent to the LLM/Image generator/TTS models.
- [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill heavily relies on
subprocess.runto execute FFmpeg for media processing. - Evidence:
add_voiceover.py,generate_video.py, andimages_to_video.pyall construct FFmpeg commands using user-provided file paths. - Risk: While the scripts use argument lists (avoiding
shell=True), theimages_to_video.pyscript dynamically generates afilelist.txtfor FFmpeg'sconcatdemuxer. Maliciously crafted filenames could potentially lead to local file inclusion or unexpected FFmpeg behavior within the host environment.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata