context-recovery
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill ingests untrusted data from external messaging platforms that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Chat history from external platforms (Discord, Slack, Telegram, Signal) fetched via
message:read(SKILL.md, Step 2). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill parses and summarizes content without using delimiters to isolate untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: Includes the ability to append to local memory files (
cat >>), execute terminal commands (jq, grep), and influence the agent's future behavior through synthesized summaries. - Sanitization: Absent. Malicious instructions embedded in chat history could be synthesized into the "Recovered Context" and permanently saved to the agent's memory in Step 6.
- [Data Exposure] (HIGH): The skill accesses sensitive local file paths containing agent interaction history and long-term memory.
- Evidence: Accesses
~/.clawdbot-*/agents/*/sessions/*.jsonland~/clawd-*/memory/(SKILL.md, Steps 3 and 4). - [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): Executes shell commands and processes local files using pipe-based logic.
- Evidence: Uses
jq,grep,ls, andxargsto process session and memory data. While using standard utilities, these operate on potentially sensitive directories (SKILL.md, Steps 3 and 4). - [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): Dynamically generates and appends content to local markdown files based on processed external data.
- Evidence: Uses a heredoc to append recovered context to a daily memory file (
~/clawd-*/memory/$(date +%Y-%m-%d).md), which may include unsanitized external content (SKILL.md, Step 6).
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata