feishu-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill documentation in
SKILL.mdincludes instructions for the agent to executecat ~/.claude.json. This file is a highly sensitive configuration file for the agent, containing API keys and connection details for all configured MCP services. Accessing this file poses a high risk of total credential exposure.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Thefeishu-mcp-setup.jssetup script andSKILL.mdusenpxto fetch and run the@larksuiteoapi/lark-mcppackage. Although this is an official package from a recognized technology provider, it constitutes a remote code download and execution vector.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes several shell scripts (feishu-mcp-setup.sh,feishu-send.sh,md2feishu.sh) and instructions that perform command-line operations, including file system access and interacting with external APIs viacurl.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests data from external Feishu sources like messages, documents, and Bitable records. Ingestion points:SKILL.md,feishu_api.py(get_bitable_records, get_messages, search_docs). Boundary markers: absent. Capability inventory:SKILL.md(Bash, Read, Write, Edit, mcp__lark-mcp_*). Sanitization: absent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata