memory-router

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill is configured to retrieve and process data from ~/.openclaw/agents/ and ~/.openclaw/, which the documentation explicitly states contain authentication tokens ("auth") and system configuration data.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Extensive file system access is granted across multiple sensitive directories (~/clawd/, ~/.openclaw/), allowing the agent to collect and potentially expose project PRDs, deliverables, and system-level configuration files.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs shell commands and provides a wrapper script (memory_router.sh) that interpolates user-controlled input into commands without sufficient sanitization, enabling argument injection. It also provides specific instructions for setting up persistence through daily and weekly cron jobs.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by pulling untrusted content from various local project files and work logs into the agent's context without boundary markers or sanitization.\n
  • Ingestion points: Multiple directories under ~/clawd/ including projects and daily memory logs.\n
  • Boundary markers: None are defined to separate retrieved content from agent instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution for qmd and grep tools.\n
  • Sanitization: None.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 3, 2026, 08:07 AM