multi-agent-architecture

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Remote Code Execution (CRITICAL): The skill configures the 'News Agent' and 'Code Agent' with the exec tool. The 'News Agent' is explicitly designed to use web_fetch to retrieve content from external websites. This combination allows for RCE if a fetched website contains malicious instructions that the agent then executes via its shell access.
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): This skill presents a significant vulnerability surface for indirect injection. \n
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the system through the 'News Agent' (web crawling) and the 'Research Agent' (document analysis). \n
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are present to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within the external data. \n
  • Capability inventory: Agents possess highly privileged tools including exec, write, read, and message. \n
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitizing the external content before it is processed by the AI.
  • Command Execution (HIGH): The 'Code Agent' is granted broad permissions (read, write, edit, exec) for development tasks. If the agent is used to review or 'fix' a malicious codebase, it could be triggered to execute harmful commands or modify system files.
  • Data Exfiltration (HIGH): The architecture allows agents to read local configuration files (e.g., in ~/.openclaw/) via the read tool and communicate externally via the message or web_fetch tools, creating a risk for the exposure of sensitive system data or credentials.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
CRITICAL
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 08:17 AM