openclaw-config-helper
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 9, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent and user to hardcode real API keys in plain text within configuration files (e.g., '必须硬编码真实 key'). It provides a specific example using an API key string format ('sk-f873092ea177b75b...'), promoting insecure secret storage practices.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill and its associated script
scripts/check_config.shaccess the sensitive configuration file~/.openclaw/openclaw.json. This file is a high-value target as it contains messaging account secrets, API credentials, and user identifiers for platforms like Telegram and WhatsApp.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs several direct system command executions includinggatewayactions to patch, apply, or retrieve system configurations, as well as theopenclaw statuscommand. It also invokes an external script located at~/clawd/skills/tavily/scripts/tavily.sh.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses theweb_fetchcapability to retrieve documentation and configuration references from the domaindocs.openclaw.ai.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external web sources and local configuration files without sufficient sanitization or boundary markers, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points: Documentation retrieved via
web_fetchfromdocs.openclaw.aiand current configuration values read from~/.openclaw/openclaw.json.\n - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided templates to delimit untrusted data.\n
- Capability inventory: Significant capabilities to modify system-wide configuration via
gateway action=config.patchandgateway action=config.apply.\n - Sanitization: No validation or escaping of external content before it is interpolated into agent reasoning or configuration commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata