qq-email-operator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script executes an external command with parameters derived from user input without adequate validation.
- Evidence: In
scripts/qq_email.py, theget_auth_codefunction constructs a lookup path for thepassutility using the--accountargument. Specifically, lines 27-31 use f-strings to build paths likef"email/qq/{account}"which are then passed tosubprocess.run(["pass", "show", path], ...). This allows an attacker to use path traversal sequences (e.g.,../../) in the account name to access secrets outside the intended directory in the user's password store. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external emails.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/qq_email.pyfetches email headers and bodies incmd_listandcmd_readfunctions. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when presenting email content to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to send and reply to emails via
cmd_sendandcmd_replyinscripts/qq_email.py. - Sanitization: There is no sanitization or filtering of the retrieved email content before it is processed by the AI agent.
Audit Metadata