react-component-generator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manifest requests 'Bash(cmd:*)' permissions, granting the agent the ability to execute any shell command. This exceeds the principle of least privilege for a task focused on React component generation.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes user-provided requests for frontend development tasks without sufficient security boundaries.
- Ingestion points: User requests containing broad triggers like 'react', 'react generator', or 'react component generator'.
- Boundary markers: The instructions provide no delimiters or specific warnings to ignore embedded instructions in user data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to high-privilege tools including 'Bash', 'Write', and 'Edit'.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization logic to handle untrusted user content.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: There is a metadata discrepancy where the 'author' field in the manifest ('Jeremy Longshore') does not align with the identified vendor ('aaaaqwq'), which could be misleading regarding the skill's provenance.
Audit Metadata