serper

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 13, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill's primary function is to extract full page content from arbitrary external URLs using trafilatura. This is a major attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Full article text is scraped from any URL returned by the Serper API (search.py via trafilatura).
  • Boundary markers: Output is formatted as JSON, but the content field contains raw, unvetted text from the web which the agent is then instructed to process.
  • Capability inventory: The skill's output is intended to be the primary source of truth for the agent's responses, meaning malicious content in the content field can directly influence agent reasoning or instructions.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of the extracted web content to remove hidden instructions or malicious payloads is mentioned.
  • Data Exposure (MEDIUM): The skill is designed to read and write sensitive configuration data (SERPER_API_KEY) from environment files like ~/.openclaw/.env. While standard for many tools, this establishes a pattern of accessing sensitive local paths.
  • External Downloads (LOW): Requires the installation of the trafilatura library from PyPI. While a legitimate library, it is an external dependency that processes untrusted HTML from the open web.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 13, 2026, 09:51 PM