tavily
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/tavily.shis vulnerable to command injection. - Evidence: The
$queryvariable is interpolated into a double-quoted JSON string used as acurldata payload. Because the variable is not escaped or handled as a literal, an attacker can use shell command substitution (e.g.,$(command)) within the query to execute arbitrary commands on the system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content from an external search API.
- Evidence: The script performs network requests to
https://api.tavily.com. This is a well-known service for AI-optimized web search. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Web search results and page content returned by the Tavily API.
- Boundary markers: No markers or delimiters are used to separate untrusted web content from agent instructions in the output.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with
Bash,Read,Write, andEditpermissions, providing a high-impact environment if the agent obeys instructions embedded in search results. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the API response before it is processed.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata