wechat-channel

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The internal API service defined in scripts/wechat-bridge.js contains a high-risk file access primitive. The /api/send endpoint accepts a path parameter for both image and file message types. The script uses this parameter directly with FileBox.fromFile(path) to read files from the host's local filesystem and send them to a WeChat recipient. An unauthorized user who reaches this API or a compromised token would allow for the arbitrary exfiltration of sensitive files (e.g., SSH keys, configuration files, or database backups) from the environment where the bridge is running.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from an external source (WeChat) and passing it to an agent with powerful capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: Incoming WeChat messages are received and processed in the handleMessage function within scripts/wechat-bridge.js.
  • Boundary markers: None. While the script removes @mentions, the core message text is forwarded to the gateway without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill's metadata in SKILL.md explicitly allows the agent to use Bash, Read, Write, and Edit tools, which can be abused if the agent is tricked by malicious message content.
  • Sanitization: No content filtering or safety validation is performed on the incoming message text before it is sent to the OpenClaw gateway.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires running a local Node.js server (scripts/wechat-bridge.js) that listens on a network port (default 3001). This increases the local attack surface, as the service handles complex data types and performs file system operations based on incoming HTTP requests.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 31, 2026, 01:00 PM