wechat-channel
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The internal API service defined in
scripts/wechat-bridge.jscontains a high-risk file access primitive. The/api/sendendpoint accepts apathparameter for bothimageandfilemessage types. The script uses this parameter directly withFileBox.fromFile(path)to read files from the host's local filesystem and send them to a WeChat recipient. An unauthorized user who reaches this API or a compromised token would allow for the arbitrary exfiltration of sensitive files (e.g., SSH keys, configuration files, or database backups) from the environment where the bridge is running. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from an external source (WeChat) and passing it to an agent with powerful capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Incoming WeChat messages are received and processed in the
handleMessagefunction withinscripts/wechat-bridge.js. - Boundary markers: None. While the script removes @mentions, the core message text is forwarded to the gateway without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill's metadata in
SKILL.mdexplicitly allows the agent to useBash,Read,Write, andEdittools, which can be abused if the agent is tricked by malicious message content. - Sanitization: No content filtering or safety validation is performed on the incoming message text before it is sent to the OpenClaw gateway.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires running a local Node.js server (
scripts/wechat-bridge.js) that listens on a network port (default 3001). This increases the local attack surface, as the service handles complex data types and performs file system operations based on incoming HTTP requests.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata