wecom-automation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The install.sh script executes several high-privilege system commands using sudo, including apt update, apt install, and managing system services like postgresql. It also executes build commands (make, sudo make install) to install database extensions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In workflows/handle_message.js, the skill uses child_process.spawn to dynamically execute various Python scripts (answer_question.py, process_file.py, ocr_image.py, transcribe_voice.py) with user-provided data from WeChat messages passed as arguments.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation script clones the pgvector repository directly from GitHub (https://github.com/pgvector/pgvector.git) to compile and install it, which is an external dependency managed outside of standard package registries.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted text, files, and images from WeChat users and passes them to Large Language Models for processing.
  • Ingestion points: Message text and file attachments received in bot.js via the onMessage event handler.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the provided handleTextMessage logic to delimit untrusted input from system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can send outbound WeChat messages, notify external services via Telegram, and perform database read/write operations.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content filtering or escaping for user-provided data before it is sent to the processing scripts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 10, 2026, 04:44 PM