adjust-playbook
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute shell commands includingls,grep,cat, andcp. - It targets sensitive local directories such as
.claude/skills/and~/.claude/skills/to manage agent instructions. - The archiving workflow uses
cp -rto create backups of directories, which involves executing shell commands with parameters derived from the environment and arguments. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Instructions for modifications are drawn from
$ARGUMENTSand the broader "conversation context," which may include untrusted data from previous agent tasks (e.g., web browsing results). - Boundary markers: The workflow does not explicitly define markers to separate trusted instructions from untrusted data within the conversation context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to rewrite other agent skills (
Edittool) and execute shell commands (Bashtool). - Sanitization: The skill relies on a manual user approval step ("Step 5: Confirm") before applying any changes, which serves as a primary defense against malicious modifications, though the agent itself might still be influenced during the proposal phase.
Audit Metadata