save-playbook

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by design, as it parses untrusted conversation history to generate instructions for future agent tasks.
  • Ingestion points: Analyzes the current conversation history (Step 1) to extract steps and patterns.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not define strict boundary markers or sanitization logic to prevent malicious instructions embedded in the conversation from being included in the generated playbook.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses Bash and Write to create and store the resulting playbooks.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization of the extracted content beyond filtering for the 'successful path'.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the Bash tool to perform filesystem operations.
  • Evidence: Step 10 executes mkdir -p and cat to create and verify the new playbook files in .claude/skills/ or ~/.claude/skills/.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill processes the entire conversation history, which may contain sensitive data disclosed during the workflow.
  • Evidence: Step 1 explicitly reviews goals, read/written files, and API calls from the history to construct the playbook.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 5, 2026, 11:46 PM