agent-browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The file
SKILL.mdincludes a bash snippet that performs anevalon theAGENT_BROWSER_CDP_LAUNCHenvironment variable. This allows for arbitrary command execution on the host system if the environment variable is controlled by an attacker or improperly configured. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: As documented in
references/commands.md, theagent-browserCLI includes anevalcommand capable of executing arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context via Base64-encoded strings or standard input. This provides a direct path for dynamic code execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core function of ingesting untrusted data from the web.
- Ingestion points: Workflow templates such as
templates/capture-workflow.shuseagent-browser get text bodyto extract text from external URLs, andSKILL.mdusesagent-browser snapshotfor page analysis. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or explicit instructions provided to the agent to prevent it from following commands that might be embedded in the scraped text or metadata.
- Capability inventory: The agent has permission to use the
Bashtool and can execute high-impact browser commands, including navigation, JavaScript execution, and local file writes (screenshots and state saving). - Sanitization: No filtering or sanitization of external content is performed before the data enters the agent's context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation in
SKILL.mdandreferences/authentication.mdmentions the installation of theappiumpackage from the official NPM registry to facilitate mobile browser automation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata