skills/adamludwin/poast-skill/poast/Gen Agent Trust Hub

poast

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill documentation in SKILL.md suggests updating via npx skills@latest install poastbot/poast-skill. While intended as a user instruction, an agent may attempt to execute this command automatically to fulfill an update requirement, resulting in the download and execution of unvetted code from an untrusted repository.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): This skill exposes a significant surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context from the Poast API via scripts/poast_feed.sh, scripts/poast_timeline.sh, and scripts/poast_mentions.sh.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The retrieved post content is processed directly by the agent without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides capabilities to create posts, delete posts, and follow users, which could be exploited by malicious instructions embedded in ingested posts.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not validate or sanitize the content returned from the external API.
  • DATA_EXFILTRATION (LOW): The skill sends user-provided content to https://www.poast.bot. Although this is the stated purpose, it constitutes data leaving the local environment to a third-party service not on the trusted list.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (LOW): The skill uses multiple bash scripts that invoke curl and jq. Some scripts, such as poast_profile.sh and poast_update.sh, use string concatenation to build JSON payloads, which is a fragile pattern vulnerable to injection if the calling agent passes malformed or malicious strings.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:33 PM