skills/agentscope-ai/hiclaw/mcporter/Gen Agent Trust Hub

mcporter

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to install the mcporter package globally from the public NPM registry (npm install -g mcporter). This introduces an external dependency that is not from a pre-verified trusted source.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands via the mcporter CLI to interact with servers and the mkdir command to create directories for newly generated skills.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves tool schemas from external MCP servers and uses that content to generate new SKILL.md files. This creates a vulnerability where a malicious MCP server could provide descriptions designed to inject instructions into the agent's persistent logic library.
  • Ingestion points: Data retrieved from external MCP servers via mcporter list --schema (as seen in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The schema content is interpolated directly into markdown templates without delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can write files to its own skills directory (~/skills/) and execute subprocesses via the mcporter command (documented in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external schema data is performed before writing it to the file system.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically creates and writes new operational logic in the form of SKILL.md files based on templates and external data inputs retrieved at runtime.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 6, 2026, 08:12 AM