ads-generate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data from external files and passing it to subordinate agents.
  • Ingestion points: Reads campaign-brief.md (markdown) and brand-profile.json (JSON) to extract prompts and style instructions.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to the sub-agents (e.g., visual-designer) to ignore instructions embedded within the brief data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill and its sub-agents have the capability to write to the file system (./ad-assets/, generation-manifest.json), spawn further agents (visual-designer, format-adapter), and execute CLI commands (/banana generate).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the content extracted from the campaign brief before it is interpolated into agent prompts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several external and local execution patterns to function.
  • It executes shell-like commands via the /banana interface (e.g., /banana setup, /banana generate).
  • It references a local Python script scripts/generate_image.py as a fallback mechanism.
  • It performs file system operations on the user's home directory, specifically reading and writing to ~/.banana/ and ~/.claude/skills/ads/references/ for configuration, pricing, and cost tracking.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 14, 2026, 06:21 PM