claude-gif-convert

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes numerous system commands via the Bash tool in SKILL.md, including ffmpeg, ffprobe, and node. It heavily relies on external scripts expected to be present at ~/.claude/skills/claude-gif/scripts/ (such as gif_convert.sh, preflight.sh, and gif_frames.py) and a specific Python virtual environment at ~/.video-skill/. Since these scripts are not included in the skill's source, their logic and safety are unverifiable.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In SKILL.md (Mode D), the skill dynamically generates a Node.js script (capture_svg.js) in the /tmp directory using a heredoc and subsequently executes it. This script uses Playwright to render and capture frames from SVG files.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md suggest using npx playwright install chromium to download and install browser binaries from Microsoft's well-known service, required for SVG-to-GIF conversion.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface and command injection risk through its handling of external files in SKILL.md.
  • Ingestion points: Reads and processes local media files (videos, images) and SVG files.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions are provided to the agent to treat file content as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including Bash, Read, Write, and Edit, enabling file manipulation and arbitrary code execution across its various modes.
  • Sanitization: User-supplied file paths and names are interpolated directly into shell command strings (e.g., "$(realpath input.svg)") without explicit sanitization or escaping of shell metacharacters, which could lead to command injection if filenames are maliciously crafted.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 9, 2026, 12:50 AM