claude-gif-convert
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes numerous system commands via the Bash tool in
SKILL.md, includingffmpeg,ffprobe, andnode. It heavily relies on external scripts expected to be present at~/.claude/skills/claude-gif/scripts/(such asgif_convert.sh,preflight.sh, andgif_frames.py) and a specific Python virtual environment at~/.video-skill/. Since these scripts are not included in the skill's source, their logic and safety are unverifiable. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
SKILL.md(Mode D), the skill dynamically generates a Node.js script (capture_svg.js) in the/tmpdirectory using a heredoc and subsequently executes it. This script uses Playwright to render and capture frames from SVG files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdsuggest usingnpx playwright install chromiumto download and install browser binaries from Microsoft's well-known service, required for SVG-to-GIF conversion. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface and command injection risk through its handling of external files in
SKILL.md. - Ingestion points: Reads and processes local media files (videos, images) and SVG files.
- Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions are provided to the agent to treat file content as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including Bash, Read, Write, and Edit, enabling file manipulation and arbitrary code execution across its various modes.
- Sanitization: User-supplied file paths and names are interpolated directly into shell command strings (e.g.,
"$(realpath input.svg)") without explicit sanitization or escaping of shell metacharacters, which could lead to command injection if filenames are maliciously crafted.
Audit Metadata