mcp-builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The file
scripts/connections.pyimplements theMCPConnectionStdioclass which utilizes themcp.client.stdio.stdio_client. This allows for the execution of arbitrary shell commands and arguments on the local host. - Evidence: The
create_connectionfactory function allows an agent to specify astdiotransport along with acommand,args, andenvvariables, which are then passed directly to a subprocess runner. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The skill documentation in
SKILL.mddirects the agent to fetch external content usingWebFetchfrom various URLs (e.g.,github.com,modelcontextprotocol.io). - Evidence: If an attacker-controlled page (e.g., a malicious documentation site or a compromised repository) provides instructions that the agent then uses to 'test' or 'initialize' a server using the
stdiotransport, it could lead to the execution of arbitrary code. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (MEDIUM): The
MCPConnectionStdioandMCPConnectionHTTPclasses allow for passing environment variables (env) and custom headers. - Evidence: An agent could be manipulated via external instructions to pass local secrets (like API keys or environment variables) into an untrusted remote MCP server via the
headersorenvparameters inconnections.py.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata