moai-alfred-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection vulnerability surface.\n
- Ingestion points: The
CodeReviewTemplateandFeatureDevelopmentTemplate(examples.md) accept external inputs such aspr_urlandfeature_description. Furthermore, theContext7Integration(SKILL.md) retrieves search results from external MCP servers.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or specific instructions provided to the agent to treat external content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted access to powerful tools including
Bash,Write,Edit, andWebFetch. TheWorkflowEngineexecutes tasks that could be influenced by malicious content within the ingested data.\n - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, filtering, or strict schema validation for the external content is present in the provided source code or configuration.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill integrates with external services using established and trusted channels.\n
- Trusted Integrations: Configuration references
@anthropic-ai/mcp-server-github, which is maintained by a trusted organization.\n - Well-Known Services: The integration with
@upstash/context7-mcputilizes a well-known technology service. These external references are appropriate for the skill's enterprise automation purpose.
Audit Metadata