moai-security-ssrf
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of fetching and processing external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data via the
proxy_urlparameter in the Express middleware (examples.md) and theurlparameter in theSSRFProtectionclass (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or delimiters used to separate external content from the agent's system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Bash,WebFetch, andWritepermissions, which could be leveraged if an attacker-controlled URL contains malicious instructions that the LLM follows. - Sanitization: The implementation focuses on SSRF validation (blocking private IPs and internal domains) but does not sanitize content to prevent instruction injection.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill configuration in
SKILL.mdexplicitly requests and is granted theBashtool permission. While no malicious shell scripts are found in the distribution, the combination of shell access with the processing of untrusted web content represents a security risk surface. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on external software and services to function.
- Dependencies: The
META.jsonand code samples reference several Node.js packages includingnode-fetch,valid-url,axios, andip. - Network API: The skill makes outbound network requests to
api.context7.aito retrieve threat intelligence and reputation data for URLs.
Audit Metadata