Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation establishes an indirect prompt injection surface within the PDF form-filling workflow.
- Ingestion points: In
forms.md, the skill converts PDF documents into PNG images for visual analysis and extracts metadata usingscripts/extract_form_field_info.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or safety markers to help the agent distinguish between its instructions and potentially malicious content embedded within the PDFs or images.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute multiple local scripts via subprocess (e.g.,
scripts/fill_pdf_form_with_annotations.py), write several JSON configuration files (fields.json), and generate modified PDF outputs. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of validation or sanitization for text and data extracted during the visual OCR or metadata analysis phases.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow is heavily dependent on the execution of local scripts and external CLI tools.
- Evidence:
forms.mdrequires the use of several utility scripts located in ascripts/directory to manage form fields, PDF conversion, and annotation. Additionally,SKILL.mdandreference.mddemonstrate usage of standard CLI utilities includingqpdf,pdftotext, andpdftk. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions direct the user to install external dependencies via standard package managers.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains instructions topip install pytesseract pdf2image. These are standard libraries for OCR and image conversion tasks.
Audit Metadata