skills/ajoslin/dot/session-export/Gen Agent Trust Hub

session-export

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 21, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The workflow for updating PR/MR descriptions utilizes a shell heredoc pattern (cat <<'EOF') that is susceptible to injection. If a fetched PR description contains the string 'EOF' followed by shell commands, the shell will terminate the heredoc early and execute the subsequent commands in the agent's environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The skill processes untrusted input by fetching existing PR/MR descriptions from remote repositories, creating an Indirect Prompt Injection surface. Evidence: 1. Ingestion points: existing PR body fetched via gh pr view. 2. Boundary markers: None; content is appended to the body. 3. Capability inventory: execution of gh, glab, and opencode CLI tools. 4. Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the fetched content is performed before shell interpolation.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION] (SAFE): The skill explicitly instructs the agent to exclude sensitive data (API keys, credentials, PII) from the generated summaries, reducing the risk of accidental exposure during the export process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 21, 2026, 07:23 AM