deepagents

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation and scripts/setup.sh facilitate the installation of several Python packages, including the core deepagents package, langchain-mcp-adapters, and provider-specific libraries such as langchain-anthropic, langchain-openai, and langchain-google-genai.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The scripts/setup.sh file includes a command to download and execute the uv package manager installer from its official domain at https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh. This is a standard and recognized installation method for this well-known development tool.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework provides a built-in execute tool which allows configured agents to perform shell command execution. This capability is intended for the framework's primary purpose of providing an autonomous agent harness.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes external file data and possesses high-privilege tools.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through filesystem tools like read_file, ls, glob, and grep (defined in references/deepagents-api.md).
  • Boundary markers: The default system prompt does not include specific delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the data retrieved from files.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful tools including execute (shell commands), write_file, and edit_file across its built-in toolset.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or validation of the content read from the filesystem before it is processed by the LLM.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 16, 2026, 01:29 AM