deepagents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's documentation and
scripts/setup.shfacilitate the installation of several Python packages, including the coredeepagentspackage,langchain-mcp-adapters, and provider-specific libraries such aslangchain-anthropic,langchain-openai, andlangchain-google-genai. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/setup.shfile includes a command to download and execute theuvpackage manager installer from its official domain athttps://astral.sh/uv/install.sh. This is a standard and recognized installation method for this well-known development tool. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework provides a built-in
executetool which allows configured agents to perform shell command execution. This capability is intended for the framework's primary purpose of providing an autonomous agent harness. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes external file data and possesses high-privilege tools.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through filesystem tools like
read_file,ls,glob, andgrep(defined inreferences/deepagents-api.md). - Boundary markers: The default system prompt does not include specific delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the data retrieved from files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful tools including
execute(shell commands),write_file, andedit_fileacross its built-in toolset. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input sanitization or validation of the content read from the filesystem before it is processed by the LLM.
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