opencontext

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the global installation of the @aicontextlab/cli package from NPM, which is an external dependency not associated with a trusted vendor or the skill author's verified resource patterns.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the Bash tool to execute system commands like 'oc init' and 'oc index build'. Furthermore, it modifies configuration files for AI editors (e.g., ~/.cursor/mcp.json, /.claude/mcp.json) and installs slash commands in user directories (/.cursor/commands, ~/.claude/commands), which acts as a persistence mechanism.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides instructions and commands to handle sensitive API keys (EMBEDDING_API_KEY) and store them in its local configuration file (~/.opencontext/opencontext.db).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests external document content and provides it as context to the agent.
  • Ingestion points: Document files retrieved from ~/.opencontext/contexts or local repositories through tools like 'oc_search' and 'oc_manifest'.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions (such as 'ignore embedded commands') are used when the agent reads the retrieved context.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows access to powerful tools including Bash, Write, and Read, which could be exploited if the agent follows malicious instructions hidden in the context.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the document content before it is interpolated into the agent's prompt context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 11, 2026, 01:50 PM