vibe-kanban
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on downloading and executing the
vibe-kanbanpackage from the NPM registry vianpx. - Evidence: Installation and execution instructions in
SKILL.md,scripts/start.sh, andtemplates/claude-mcp-config.jsonusenpx vibe-kanbanas the primary startup method. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of
npxallows for the execution of remotely fetched code on the host system at runtime. - Evidence:
scripts/start.shcontains the commandexec npx vibe-kanban. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides scripts that automate the modification of sensitive local configuration files and perform destructive git operations.
- Evidence:
scripts/mcp-setup.shprogrammatically modifies~/.claude/claude_desktop_config.jsonand~/.codex/config.tomlto register tool capabilities. - Evidence:
scripts/cleanup.shexecutesgit branch -Dandgit worktree remove --force. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by interpolating user-provided task descriptions into agent CLI commands without visible sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Task descriptions entered via the board UI or the
vk_create_cardMCP tool as documented inSKILL.mdandreferences/mcp-api.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; user input is passed as a string argument to agent executables (e.g.,
-p "<task-description>"). - Capability inventory: The skill manages agents with access to
Bash,Write,Grep,Glob, andReadtools. - Sanitization: No evidence of input escaping or validation for the task description before it is passed to agent CLIs.
Audit Metadata