claudekit
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to add a third-party plugin marketplace (
duthaho/claudekit-marketplace) and install theclaudekitplugin. This behavior downloads code from an unverified GitHub repository. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Installing a plugin directly into the agent's execution environment allows external code to run with the agent's full permissions, including access to the local filesystem and network tools.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require running
/claudekit:init, which executes opaque logic via theBashtool to scaffold project files. This command could perform undocumented system modifications or file operations. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Configuration files generated in
.claude/rules/,.claude/modes/, and.claude/hooks/(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to validate or treat these generated files as potentially untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill requests access to
Bash,Read,Write, andWebFetchtools. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not implement any content validation for the files it generates or the data it processes during the initialization wizard.
Audit Metadata