graphify

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the installation of the graphifyy package from PyPI. There is a naming discrepancy between the tool's common name ('graphify') and the requested package name ('graphifyy'), which can be a sign of typosquatting or an unofficial distribution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes graphify install [platform] commands for a wide range of assistants (Claude, Cursor, Gemini, Copilot, etc.). These commands likely modify local application configurations or install hooks/plugins, which constitutes a persistence-like mechanism and environment modification.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8):
  • Ingestion points: The tool ingests untrusted external data via graphify add <URL> and by scanning local codebase files (code, docs, PDFs, media).
  • Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within the processed files or URLs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to Bash, Read, Write, Grep, and Glob tools, and provides Python snippets that utilize the pathlib and graphify modules to generate reports and HTML visualizations.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested external content is mentioned before it is processed into the GRAPH_REPORT.md or graph.json files which the agent subsequently reads.
  • [ADVERSARIAL_CONTEXT]: There is a mismatch between the provided author context ('akillness') and the repository/package source ('safishamsi/graphify'). The repository and package are hosted under an account that does not align with the vendor identity provided in the system context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 20, 2026, 04:31 AM