omc
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill installs software from unverified external sources. It fetches a plugin from
https://github.com/Yeachan-Heo/oh-my-claudecodeand suggests a global npm package installation foroh-my-claude-sisyphus. These sources are not affiliated with the stated author 'akillness' nor are they included in the trusted vendors list. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires extensive command-line permissions, including the
Bashtool. It uses these permissions to perform global installations (npm install -g), modify system configuration files (~/.claude/settings.json), and manage background daemons (omc wait --start). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
- Ingestion points: Processes natural language tasks and PR bodies as input for agent orchestration (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the orchestration logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bash,Write, andEdittools, allowing for file modification and code execution based on agent outputs (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content processed by the 32 specialized agents.
Audit Metadata