opencontext

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to install a global CLI package (@aicontextlab/cli) from npm and points to external software releases on GitHub (0xranx/OpenContext). These sources are not recognized as trusted organizations or well-known services, posing a risk of untrusted code execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: To function, the skill relies on the Bash tool to execute commands through the oc CLI. This allows the skill to interact with the local filesystem, manage a local database (~/.opencontext/opencontext.db), and communicate with embedding APIs, which could be leveraged for unauthorized actions if the CLI tool is compromised.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a high surface area for indirect prompt injection (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through oc_search, oc_manifest, and documents stored in ~/.opencontext/contexts.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters mentioned in the skill to treat retrieved context as untrusted data or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including Bash command execution and Write file access.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the retrieved content is provided. If a stored document contains malicious instructions, the agent may execute them with the privileges assigned to the skill.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 11, 2026, 01:20 PM