strix
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation script
scripts/install.shand documentation inSKILL.mdandreferences/commands.mdrecommend installing the CLI viacurl -sSL https://strix.ai/install | bash. This pattern downloads and executes arbitrary code from a remote server without verification. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses wrapper scripts (
scripts/run-scan.sh,scripts/ci-scan.sh) to execute thestrixbinary anddockercommands on the host system. It requires an active Docker daemon and can pull container images from remote registries. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to ingest and analyze content from untrusted external sources like GitHub repositories and live URLs.
- Ingestion points: Target URLs and repository paths are passed to the tool via the
--targetor-tflag inscripts/run-scan.shandSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill suggests using
--instruction-filefor scoping and rules of engagement, but this does not provide a technical boundary to prevent instructions embedded in target data from influencing the agent's behavior. - Capability inventory: The skill is granted
BashandWebFetchtools and interacts with the system'sDockerenvironment. - Sanitization: There is no evidence in the skill's wrapper scripts that content from external targets is sanitized or filtered before being processed by the underlying AI-driven tool.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://strix.ai/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata